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1 INTRODUCTION 
Internet technology is so pervasive today, as it provides a baseline for people to do online banking, education, entertainment 
and social networking 1. This opens up the back door for cyber-criminals to hack into sensitive information of individuals or 
organisation 2. It often happens through social engineering (i.e. phishing) 3. 
Phishing is a type of semantic attack 4, often used to steal user sensitive information including login credentials and credit card 
numbers 5 6 7. It occurs when an attacker, masquerading as a trusted entity, entice a victim into clicking on a link or opening an 
 
Abstract 
Phishing is a type of social engineering attack with an intention to steal user data, 
including login credentials and credit card numbers, leading to financial losses for 
both organisations and individuals. It occurs when an attacker, pretending as a trusted 
entity, lure a victim into click on a link or attachment in an email, or in a text message. 
Phishing is often launched via email messages or text messages over social networks. 
Previous research has revealed that phishing attacks can be identified just by looking 
at URLs. Identifying the techniques which are used by phishers to mimic a phish- 
ing URL is rather a challenging issue. At present, we have limited knowledge and 
understanding of how cyber-criminals attempt to mimic URLs with the same look 
and feel of the legitimate ones, to entice people into clicking links. Therefore, this 
paper investigates the feature selection of phishing URLs (Uniform Resource Loca- 
tors), aiming to explore the strategies employed by phishers to mimic URLs that can 
obviously trick people into clicking links. We employed an Information Gain (IG) 
and Chi-Squared feature selection methods in Machine Learning (ML) on a phish- 
ing dataset. The dataset contains a total of 48 features extracted from 5000 phishing 
and another 5000 legitimate URL from web pages downloaded from January to May 
2015 and from May to June 2017. Our results revealed that there were 10 techniques 
that phishers used to mimic URLs to manipulate humans into clicking links. Identi- 
fying these phishing URL manipulation techniques would certainly help to educate 
individuals and organisations and keep them safe from phishing attacks. In addition, 
the findings of this research will also help develop anti-phishing tools, framework or 
browser plugins for phishing prevention. 
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attachment in an email or instant message through social messaging services such as WhatsApp, Viber or Facebook Messenger 8. 
Victim is then tricked into clicking a malicious link or open an attachment, perhaps leading to install malware (i.e. malicious 
IT application), which can disturb the normal behaviour of a computer system 6. For example, once the phishing link is clicked, 
it can automatically download a malicious IT application, so called “ransomware", which encrypts all the files, folders, images, 
videos, and audios on the victim’s computer system 9. 
Detecting phishing attacks is a challenging task 10, due to methods used by phishers to trick people into clicking links. They 
often employ various techniques to mimic phishing web addresses, so called Unified Resource Locations (URLs), to fool the 
users. For example, domain name in the URL is unknown or misspelled - domain name in the phishing URL is different to the 
legitimate organisation. This can often be an unknown domain or rather a misspelled version of the legitimate domain such as 
http://www.g0og1e.com (a.k.a. typo squatting 11). There is another popular method is Internationalised Domain Name (IDN) 
spoofing or homograph attack. In this, phishers buy a URL that includes characters that appear to be English letters, but are 
actually from a different language set. For example Latin "c" or "a" being replaced by the Cyrillic "c" or "a". Another well known 
technique is Open URL Redirection 12, where a malicious script is tacked onto what appears to be a legitimate website address. 
But it takes the visitor to a phishing website without the users knowledge. However, they have used a set of common features 
like Lengthy URL, Anchor URL, Suffix and Prefix special characters, Irregular URL, etc 13 to mimic these kind of phishing 
URLs’ techniques. 
In general, there are two types of methods stated in the past research to detect and protect people from phishing attacks 14. 
First one is based on blacklist, by comparing the requested URL with the URLs available in the blacklist. The downside of 
this approach is that the blacklist usually covers all phishing websites, nevertheless a new phishing website appears in a short 
while 15. The second one is heuristic-based approach. In this, several features are extracted from the phishing URL to classify 
either fraudulent or legitimate. In the past literature Waleed Ali 16 proposed a phishing detection approach based on supervised 
learning with wrapper features selection, Mofleh-Al-diabat 13 used classification mining techniques for detecting and predicting 
phishing website, Neda Abdelhamid 17 proposed an approach for phishing detection based on the associative classification and 
Rami M. Mohammed 18 used Self-structuring Neural Network for predicting phishing website. However, previous research has 
failed to identify the techniques or strategies used by cyber-criminals (i.e. phishers) to mimic legitimate URLs 19. Identifying 
techniques or strategies used by cyber-criminals (i.e. phishers) to mimic phishing URL is imperative to combat against phishing 
attacks 3 (i.e. developing anti-phishing tools, frameworks and browser plugins development). 
Therefore, this research focuses on investigating the feature selection of phishing URLs (Uniform Resource Locators), aiming 
to explore the techniques employed by phishers to mimic phishing URLs that can obviously trick people into clicking links. 
Machine Learning (ML) techniques enable in classifying various features of phishing URLs 20 11. Algorithms provided in ML 
help identify the pattern of phishing URL, sentence form of the phishing emails, identify suspicious attachments and links in 
the phishing email, and even measure the emotional factor of the phishing email, etc. In this research, we employ ML feature 
selection techniques (i.e. Information Gain (IG) and Chi-Squared) around 10000 URLs to identify specific features of how 
phishers mimic URLs to leverage their attack. The data-set used in this study collected from the 21 website that were collected 
from January to May 2015 and from May to June 2017. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related works and compare different phishing feature extrac- 
tion methods presented in the literature.Section 3 describes the methodology for feature selection of phishing URLs, aiming to 
explore the techniques used by phishers to mimic legitimate URLs. Section 4 presents the results and discusses the uniqueness 
of the proposed research work. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5 opening up for future work. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
Walled Ali 16 proposed a wrapper-based feature selection method to select the most significant features in predicting the phishing 
websites accurately.Authors have used a phishing website, dataset derived from UCI Machine Learning Repository 22. Their find- 
ings revealed that supervised learning classifiers, Back-Propagation Neural Networks (BPNN), k-Nearest Neighbours (KNN), 
and Random-Forest (RF) in ML are achieving the best Correct Classification Rate (CCR) 11 and Radial Basis Function Network 
(RBFN), Naive Bayes (NB) achieved the worst CCR for detecting phishing websites. The authors revealed 30 key features of 
phishing websites through the dataset. The best feature subset is decided based on the highest evaluation to be used in the train- 
ing of the machine learning classifiers. The downside of this feature selection approach is, consume more time and requires extra 
computational overhead with some classifiers. Dataset they are used for the research is pretty old 22 and most of the identified 
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features are not only URL-related, but also domain-related and content-related. Those features haven’t revealed the modern tech- 
niques that are used to mimic URLs such as Null Self Redirect Hyperlinks (NSRH) in URL, Domain name mismatch, Number 
of dashes in the URL, etc 23. Furthermore, the authors failed to articulate how cyber-criminals used aforementioned features to 
manipulate people through phishing attacks. 
Jain, Ankit Kumar and Gupta, Brij B 24 presented a survey report on phishing detection approaches based on visual similarity. 
They have provided a feature set of visual similarity like text content, text format, HTML tags, Cascading Style Sheet (CSS), 
image and so forth. It provides a better understanding of phishing website, various solutions, and future scope in phishing 
detection. In addition, they have pointed out the limitations in phishing detection like accuracy, the countermeasure against new 
phishing websites, failing to detect embedded objects. They have identified text based similarity approaches which are relatively 
fast, but they are unable to detect phishing attack if text is replaced with some images. Image processing based approaches  
has a high accuracy rate while they are complex in nature and time-consuming. Nevertheless, the authors failed to discuss the 
strategies or techniques used to mimic URLs. 
Al-diabat, Mofleh 13 proposed a feature selection approach aiming to determine the effective set of features in-terms of improv- 
ing the performance of the classification. In this research, they have used two feature selection methods such as Information 
Gain(IG) and Symmetrical Uncertainty (SU) to detect a small set of correlation among features. From that, they have identified 
eleven common features. Among those features SSL-Final-state and URL-of-Anchor identified as first two top scored features. 
Mined features guide the IREP and C4.5 data mining algorithms to classify phishing website with high accuracy. The labelled 
(-1 (Phishy) or 1 (Legitimate)) dataset contains 11000 URL samples and 30 phishing website related features collected from 
Phishtank 23 and Yahoo Directory 25 websites. Their result not discussed what are URL features have correlation and how they 
are influenced in the phishing attack or mimic URLs. Also, they are not presented how these mined features improve the clas- 
sification of phishing or legitimate. If the classifier only used correlated features for the classification it might have possibility 
of missed some other important phishing related features. 
Abdelhamid, Neda and Ayesh, Aladdin and Thabtah, Fadi 17 proposed a research work for phishing detection based on Asso- 
ciative Classification (AC).Their research work mainly focusing on developing rules to identify the phishing websites. Chi-square 
method used for feature selection to identify significant features related to the phishing website and AC data mining technique 
to discover the correlations among features and produces them in simple rules. Their method can able to discover new rules that 
are connected with more than one target class. They have achieved higher predictive accuracy by using Multi Class Classifica- 
tion based Association Rules(MCAR) algorithm. Its ability not only to extract one class per rule, but also all possible classes 
in a dis-junction form. The identified rules are inaccurate with the new features available in the latest phishing dataset 23. Also, 
they are not mentioned how this approach going to incorporate if a new feature introduced by the cyber-criminals to mimic a 
phishing attack. 
Mohammad, Rami M and Thabtah, Fadi and McCluskey, Lee 14 is mainly focused on identifying groups of features and 
developing a set of rules which are used to distinguish a phishing website from the legitimate ones. They have extracted the 
features automatically without any human intervention by using their own software tool. Based on the selected features they 
have proposed a set of rules which are used to distinguish a phishing website from the legitimate ones. The dataset used by them 
collected from PhishTank 23. From that, the authors have considered 17 features by calculating the frequency of each features. 
Finally, they have identified “Request URL", “HTTPS and SSL" are more significant and “Disabling Right Click" followed by 
“URL having @ symbol" are low significant features. They are not reason out why they are only considered 17 features and how 
they identified those features, among the other features available in the dataset. They are not addressed the group of features 
which are influenced in phishing attack 
In all previous research 17 14 13 24 11 work has been focused on improving the phishing attack classification rate, identify the 
best classifier to identify phishing attack, address the different types of phishing detection approaches and feature selection of 
the phishing URL to reduce the dimension of the phishing dataset. But they failed to identify strategies or techniques, cyber- 
criminals used to mimic URLs to manipulate humans. Features identified in previous research work not only focused on URLs, 
but also domain-related (i.e. registration, indexing) and content-related (occurrences of other URLs though). Therefore, previous 
work failed to address how URL-related, domain-related and content-related features are combined to manipulate humans or 
identify features that are more successful in launching a phishing attack. In most of these previous research work just provided 
the classification rates as an outcome, but they failed to mention how these classification rates are supported in developing anti- 
phishing educational interventions. There has been a lack of research reported in the past understanding phishers’ strategies  
of mimicking URLs to leverage phishing attacks through human manipulation, thus using a large dataset (i.e. analysing using 
ML techniques). Therefore, this research focuses on investigating the feature selection of phishing URLs (Uniform Resource 
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Locators), aiming to explore the strategies employed by phishers to mimic URLs that can obviously trick people into clicking 
links or download a malicious IT application (e.g. ransomware attack) that can disturb the normal behaviour of a computer 
system. 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
This research focuses on investigating strategies or techniques that are used by phishers to mimic URLs to leverage phishing 
attacks through manipulating humans. Figure 1 illustrates how we identify and evaluate the topmost features (techniques to 
mimic URLs) from the dataset which is downloaded from 1. This dataset contains 48 features related to the phishing URL  
and the phishing website. Target class labeled either Legitimate (1) or Phishing (0). Phishing webpage data downloaded from 
PhishTank2, OpenPhish3 and Legitimate ones are downloaded from Alexa4 and Common Crawl5 
According to Figure 1, methodology of this research work has two phases. Phase 1 identifies the topmost features that are 
employed by cyber-criminals to mimic URLs. To identify the topmost features we are assessing their frequency measure. The 
frequency measure explains how a specific feature influences the target class (Phishing or Legitimate). Higher frequency score 
feature considered as the most influenced feature in mimic URLs for phishing attacks. To measure the frequency score within 
the URL feature and target class, we employed Information Gain (IG) and Chi-Squared feature selection methods 26. 
The Algorithm 1 describes how to perform Information Gain (IG) and Chi-Squared on the phishing URL features. To 
calculates the IG for each URL feature, first it calculates the entropy of the phishing URLs’ data. 
4 ‘ 
Entropy 27 is used to measure the impurity, disorder or uncertainty in a bunch of data. As stated in the equation 1 P(x) is 
simply the frequentest probability of class x. In this experiment, the class x can either be a phishing(1) or legitimate(0). Then 
the value obtain from the equation 1 represents the frequentest probability of class phishing and legitimate. This entropy value 
is considered as a parent entropy (Entropy(parent)) during the calculation of Information Gain (IG) on phishing URL features. 
Entropy = − P (x) × log2 P (x) (1) 
We then calculate the IG for each phishing URL feature using the entropy score. According to the equation 2, the entropy value 
each phishing URL feature (i.e: Entropy(children))is subtracted from the parent entropy (Entropy(parent)). The resultant value 
an IG of the specific phishing URL’s feature. The obtained score describes how a specific phishing URL feature influences  
he identification of the target class (phishing, legitimate). The most influential techniques of manipulating phishing URL are 
identified based on the IG score features 
Informationgain = Entropy(parent) − W eightedauerage × Entropy(children) (2) 
W eightedauerage = no.ofexamplesinthechildnode/totalnumberofexampleinparentnode (3) 
Then we perform the calculation of Chi-Squared score for each phishing URL feature based on the equation 4. In the Chi-
Squared 28 approach, we compare each phishing URL feature with the target class(phishing). If they are independent, then 
observed count of the class(phishing) is close to the expected count of the class(phishing).Thus we get a smaller 3˜2  value. On 
the other hand, if the phishing URL feature is dependent with the target class(phishing), we will get a higher 3˜ 2  value. We 
have used this technique to identify the dependency between each URL feature and target class(phishing). Table 1 shows the 
3˜ 2  values for top 20 features. The features present in the Table 1 highly depend on the target class(phishing). Thus, they are 
selected as an important technique of mimicking URLs for phishing attacks 
 
 
 
 
1 https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/h3cgnj8hft/1 
2 https://www.phishtank.com/developerinfo.php 
3 https://openphish.com/ 
3˜2 = 
1 
n 
d 
k=1 
(Ok − Ek)2 
 
Ek 
(4) 
4 https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Computers/Internet/OntheW eb/W ebApplications/Databases 
5 https://commoncrawl.org/ 
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FIGURE 1 Methodology for Identifying Phishing URL 
 
Ok = number of observations in class k 
Ek = number of expected observations in class k 
Once we have calculated the IG and Chi-Squared score for each URL feature, we are sorted those scores in descending order. 
After that we create three combined datasets by combining top n = 10, 15 and 20 features obtained from IG and Chi-Squared. 
Then we have used these combined datasets for the classification of phishing URLs. 
 
 
Algorithm 1 Select top n features 
 
1:  procedure SELECTTOPNFEATURES(listoffeatures, n) ⊳ Step1: select top n features using IG 
2: ⊳ n: 10,15 and 20 
3: igF eatures › calculateIg(listoffeatures) 
4: sortedIgF eatures › sort(listoffeatures) 
5: selectedT opnIg › selectfeatures(sortedIGFeatures) ⊳ Step2: select top n features using Chi-Squared 
6: 
7: chiF eatures › calculateChiSquared(listoff eatures) 
8: sortedChiF eatures › sort(listoffeatures) 
9: selectedT opnChi › selectfeatures(sortedChiF eatures) ⊳ Step3: Create combined dataset by using step1 and step2 
10: 
11: combinednfeatures › combine(selectedT opnIg, selectedT opnChi) 
12: return combinednfeatures 
13: end procedure 
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Al-diabat, Mofleh 13 also use IG and Symmetrical Uncertainty (SU) for feature selection. Authors use the common features 
obtained from both the methods for classification. Abdelhamid, Neda and Ayesh, Aladdin and Thabtah, Fadi 17 proposed research 
work, that they use Chi-Squared to identify the dependency among the features and to group those dependent features for clas- 
sification. However, when perform grouping among the features, we may miss some important influencial features. Therefore, 
for this research, we have combined the features that are obtained from IG and Chi-Squared. Our intention was to identify the 
top features(i.e. URL mimicking techniques) that are used by phishers to mimic URLs to leverage phishing attacks through 
manipulating humans. 
In phase 2, we perform a classification to evaluate three combined datasets. In this regard, three combined datasets are guid- 
ing one by one into three well known classifiers such as Naive-Bayes, LinearSVC (Support Vector Classifier) and K Nearest 
Neighbors (KNN). Once the classifiers are trained, they are evaluated against the testing data. The Figure 2 illustrates a com- 
parison based on the performance between the original dataset (for 48 features) and the combined datasets (for 10, 15 and 20 
features). The accuracy of the classification using combined datasets is comparatively higher than the original dataset. Based 
on the accuracy result presented in Table 2 we can conclude that the identified features available in the combined datasets are 
the most influential techniques employed by cybercriminals’ to mimic URLs. In this research, we only focuses on 10, 15 and 
20 features as the level of accuracy performed high (almost 100%) for classifying phishing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Classification rate for different number of features 
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<a href="//fossbytes.com" target="_blank">Fossbytes</a>. 
4 RESULT 
4.1 Dataset 
The dataset of phishing websites is downloaded from the 21 site. A total of 48 features is extracted from 5000 phishing webpages 
and another 5000 legitimate webpages, downloaded from January to May 2015 and from May to June 2017. Target class labeled 
either Legitimate (1) or Phishing (0). Phishing webpage data downloaded from PhishTank 23, OpenPhish 29 and Legitimate ones 
are downloaded from Alexa 30 and Common Crawl 31. 
 
4.2 Experimental Setup 
Phishing dataset consists of 10000 records. We have split our dataset (70%) for training and (30%) for testing. Then we did the 
feature selection process by using IG and Chi-Squared as stated in the above sections 3.2 and 3.3. Thereafter, we have performed 
classification for best 20, 15 and 10 features. Table 2 provides a detailed accuracy rate for different number of features. For top 
10 features K-Nearest-Neighbour(KNN) classifier performed well than other two classifiers. When we increase the number of 
features as 15 and 20 LinearSVC and KNN, are providing best accuracy rates. 
 
4.3 Summary of the Result 
In the past literature proposed by Al-diabat, Mofleh 13 they found that SSL-Final-state and URL-of-Anchor are the two top- 
most phishing website related features. In the Mohammad, Rami M and Thabtah, Fadi and McCluskey, Lee 14   research   
work they have  identified "Request URL", "HTTPS and SSL" are more significant and features in phishing website. Both    
of them used UCI Phishing dataset 22  for  their experiment. This dataset is pretty much old and most of the features relate      
to phishing websites. But in our experiment we have  used new phishing dataset 21 since the data was collected between   
2015 to 2017 and most of the features are related to the phishing URL. Among the 48 features, our results revealed that 
PctNullSelfRedirectHyperlinks, FrequentDomainNameMismatch, SubmitInfoToEmail, PctExtResourceUrls, InsecureForms, 
ExtMetaScriptLinkRT, PctExtNullSelfRedirectHyperlinksRT, NumDash, IframeOrFrame, NumSensitiveWords, PctExtHyper- 
links, NumNumericChars and NumDots are to be the topmost URL mimic techniques. Among these Null Self Redirect 
Hyperlinks in URL, Number of Dashes in URL, Submit Information to Mail, Insecure Forms, IframeOrFrame and URL Attached 
with the Number of Sensitive Words are the most recent URL mimicking techniques. These techniques are employed by phish- 
ers to mimic URLs to leverage their attacks through manipulating humans. These techniques well influenced in the modern 
phishing attack because of the growth of heterogeneity of modern devices, the number of users using social media Apps and 
insecure online shopping or banking applications. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
In this section we are going to discuss how the identifies feature are employed by phishers to mimic URLs to leverage their 
attacks. 
Null Self Redirect Hyperlinks in URL: The user hits a link (anchor tag) on a web page, and it opens in a new browser 
tab. In this stage, chances are high that a hacker might have taken a control over the user’s original tab web page. For 
example attached target="_blank" inside the anchor tag like as follows 
 
 
 
If user click on the link it will redirect to the new tab and pointing to another web page. That page is actually a malicious page 
and it has full control over the previous page’s document. The attacker designed that page to look like the original page. Then 
asking user’s login credentials or credit card details. But user likely wouldn’t notice this because the redirect happened in the 
background as shown below in Figure ??. 
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FIGURE 3 Null Self Redirect Hyperlinks in URL 
 
Domain Name Mismatch: Domain names are hijacked with the intent to steal customers’ data and taken out the competitor’s 
website. For example, a domain name info.brienposy.com would be a child domain of brienposy.com, because it appears at 
the end of the full domain name. But the domain name, brienposy.com.malicious.com not originated from brienposy.com 
since the parent domain name brienposy.com is on the left side of the full domain name. This URL mimics by the attacker    
to fool the user that it’s from the brienposy.com. This kind of trick used by phishers as a means of trying to convince victims 
the message or email came from a well-known company. Figure ?? illustrates how the phishers mimic the URL for the website 
myetherwallet.com as myetherwallel.com 
 
 
FIGURE 4 Domain Name Mismatch 
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Number of Dashes in URL: Phishers imitate legitimate domain names by inserting dashes into the URL. An unsuspecting 
user believes it is legitimate domain name. For example, the phishing domain name http://www.pay-pal.com is imitating 
PayPal domain name, http://www.paypal.com. However, the use of dashes in a domain name is rarely seen on a legitimate 
website. This technique can easily deceive users who do not understand the syntax of the URL and cannot tell the different 
domain name. Figure ?? shows an example of the URL with dashes 
 
 
FIGURE 5 Number of Dashes in URL 
 
Submit Information to Mail:      Phishers create an email which claims user is enticed www.google.com/ConfirmAccount  
to confirm an ownership of their account. When the user clicks on the URL, a malicious script executes in the background to 
hijack the user’s account information. Then the attacker, monitor the page, hijacks the original password to gain access to secured 
data of the user’s account. For example, Figure 6 shows an email which is mimicked as receive from an www.google.com. It 
asked their customer to verify the account ownership by clicking on a link (i.e. phishing link) of the confirmation email. For 
example, www.google.com/ConfirmAccount?Email=hijacker@gmail.com is a kind of phishing link, sending the user’s 
account information to an attacker’s email (hijacker@gmail.com). This is another important strategy in email phishing that 
cyber-criminals used to manipulate humans to disclose their information. 
Insecure Forms: The webpage contains a form which does not use https, rather it uses http which is insecure. Hackers 
copied the layout of the login page of the well-known companies like Microsoft, Apple, etc. Then asks users to verify their 
account or re-set password for security purpose. When the user gives personal information it will send to the hacker’s own 
server or their database instead of Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, etc application’s original server. Figure ?? is an example for the 
fraudulent Microsoft account web page it asks the user to verify their account details, but the URL of the webpage is not related 
to the Microsoft. 
Number of Dots in URL: Phishing URL usually has many dots to make users believe that they are genuine page. Chiew, 
Kang Leng and Choo, Jeffrey Soon-Fatt and Sze, San Nah and Yong, Kelvin SC 32 stated legitimate website has at most five dots 
in the URL domain while most phishing websites have five or more dots in the URL domain. Phishers use such tricks to obfuscate 
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FIGURE 6 Submit Information to Mail 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 Insecure Forms 
 
internet users from perceiving the actual phishing URL. For example the following URL has six dots in the domain name 
www.network.solutions.com.012892378267.239827432.mobi/login,secure.  When   an   attacker   manipulates   this   kind   
of URL, usually they ask the user to perform some action like a login. But the user might not notice the number of dots in the 
domain name. When user click on the link to perform some action from that moment user’s account became under the control 
of the attacker. It is a well-known phishing strategy used by attackers in targeting the domain name based phishing attack. 
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URL Attached with the Number of Sensitive Words: Phishing URLs attached within the sensitive words to pretend to be 
legitimate websites. For example, an attacker sends a phishing URL with the sensitive words like secure, account, update, login, 
sign-in, banking confirm and verify can force users to click on the URL and submit forms with their private information. Figure 
8 shows an example for sensitive words in mimicking a URL. An attacker mimics Bank of America security email and create an 
urgency by using the word "We detect unusual activity in your debit card". It’s another kind of strategy based on the sentiment 
analysis of the user. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8 Number of sensitive words 
 
IFrame or Frame: The IFrame is an HTML document embedded inside another HTML document. IFrame 
injection is known as cross-site scripting attack 33. It consists of one or more IFrame tags that have been 
inserted into a page or post’s content. Which is typically downloaded an executable program or conducts  
other actions that compromise the victim’s computer.For example, if the URL of the webpage like as follows 
http://www.google.com/index.php?ParamUrl=robots.txtParamWidth=250ParamHeight=250 then this a 
sign of IFrame injection.  Since  an  attacker  can  run  a  malicious  script  by  closing  the  ifram  tag 
as shown below http://www.google.com/index.php?ParamUrl=robots.txtParamWidth=250ParamHeight=250 
"></iframe><a  href="javascript:void(document.cookie="authorization=true")"></a>.  This   will 
result to change the current cookie parameter authorization=false to authorization=true, then a 
malicious user will be able to gain access to the sensitive information of the user.  
In addition to that, we also identified the co-relations among these techniques. The co-relation matrix in Figure 9 illustrates 
hat when an attacker sends an email with a mismatch domain named URL, it redirects into the attacker’s website through the 
embedded hyperlink. Since the techniques PctExtNullSelfRedirectHyperlinksRT and FrequentDomainNameMismatch show 
at 0.6 (60%)co-relation. It also showed 30% co-relation between NumDots and NumSensitiveWords which means when an 
attacker manipulate the URLs with unwanted dots in the domain name mostly attached that URLs with the sensitive words/text. 
This is another strategy employed by the attackers to steal user’s information. 
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FIGURE 9 Co-relation among selected techniques 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Investigating techniques used by phishers to trick people into disclosing their credentials are vital. Therefore, this research 
investigates the feature selection of phishing URLs (Uniform Resource Locators), aiming to explore the techniques employed by 
phishers to mimic phishing URLs to lure people to do malicious tasks such as clicking on fake links. We employed the feature 
selection method, namely Information Gain (IG) and Chi-Squared, in ML, through a phishing dataset 21. This dataset contains 
48 features extracted from 5000 phishing URLs (PhishTank, OpenPhish) and 5000 legitimate URLs (Alexa, Common Crawl), 
downloaded from January to May 2015 and from May to June 2017. Our results revealed that the top 10 techniques phishers 
employed to mimic URL to leverage their attacks through manipulating humans. Among them, Null Self Redirect Hyperlinks 
in URL and Domain Name Mismatch are the most often used techniques to mimic URLs that can trick people to perform 
various malicious functions. Furthermore, identify phishing techniques can improve the phishing detection solutions. Improving 
phishing detection accuracy when a long-term benign domain decides to begin carrying out malicious phishing activity; and 
reducing the number of false positives for benign domains that are running for a very short period of time. We believe this 
research will improve the anti-phishing training in terms of gamification to train user against phishing attacks. For example, 
cyber security educational interventions can be designed and developed understanding the strategies or techniques employed by 
cyber-criminals. 
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Classifiers Number of features 
Naive-Bayes 0.837 
48 
0.945 
10 
0.938 
15 20 
   K-Nearest-Neighbours 0.871 1.0 1.0 1.0  
LinearSVC 0.918 0.809 0.954 0.957 
0.931 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL Feature 3˜ 2  ±0.01 
PctExtNullSelfRedirectHyperlinksRT 3028.93 
FrequentDomainNameMismatch 1971.20 
NumDash 1138.26 
SubmitInfoToEmail 1027.15 
PctNullSelfRedirectHyperlinks 944.58 
InsecureForms 745.96 
NumDots 682.73 
PctExtHyperlinks 550.03 
NumSensitiveWords 505.98 
IframeOrFrame 399.65 
PathLevel 363.94 
AbnormalExtFormActionR 221.52 
UrlLengthRT 199.51 
HostnameLength 194.87 
NumDashInHostname 168.57 
NumQueryComponents 154.48 
EmbeddedBrandName 152.04 
AbnormalFormAction 135.22 
IpAddress 120.64 
DomainInPaths 106.73 
TABLE 1 Chi-Squared value for URL features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 .Classification rate for different number of features 
